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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention)'
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol)2 were
designed to protect persons whose need to remain abroad is a result of fear
of persecution based on civil or political status.3 The language of the
Convention is broad.4 It was designed to protect a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
5
1. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189
U.N.T.S. 2545 [hereinafter Convention].
2. U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol].
3. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 10 (1991) [hereinafter
HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS] (observing that "only persons whose migration is prompted by a
fear of persecution on the ground of civil or political status come within the scope of the
Convention-based protection system.").
4. See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Abdi [1999] F.C.A. 299, 39 (26
March 1999) (explaining that in light of the purpose of the Convention, it is a "well-settled principle
that a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation must be given to the language" of the refugee
definition). See generally Convention, supra note 1, pmbl., art. I (noting that the "the term 'refugee'
shall apply to anyperson" who fulfills the refugee criteria) (emphasis added).
5. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, § (A)(2).
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At first glance, this language seems potentially to encompass all persons,
regardless of age6, sex,7 or cognitive level. However, the dominant
international interpretation of the phrase "well-founded fear" has restricted
the Convention in such a way as to require, at a minimum, an expression of
fear by the refugee applicant.8 The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook9 and numerous jurisdictions including
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Hong
Kong, and Ireland have restricted the ability of the Convention to be applied
universally by requiring persons seeking refugee protection to fulfill both an
objective risk plus a subjective apprehension element under the well-
founded fear analysis.' 0 By forcing an applicant to prove his or her state of
6. There is no lower age limit to the right to claim asylum. Jacqueline Bhabha, "More Than
Their Share of Sorrows ": International Migration Law and The Rights of Children, 22 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 253, 266 (2003) [hereinafter Bhabha, Rights of Children] (citing Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A(Iil), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); Convention, supra note 1, arts. 32-33; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
pmbl., Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173; Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114;
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa art. 1, % 1-2, Sept.
10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the
International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama art. III, 3, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OAS/Ser.L/V/1|.66, doc. 10, rev. 1 (1984)).
7. Julie R. Hess, United States and Africa on FGM. Cultural Comparatives, Resolutions, and
Rights, 10 ILSA J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 581, 593 (2004) (explaining that the "U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees[] affords a broad interpretation of women's rights so as to provide
women the same protections as men."). See UNHCR, SEXUAL AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE
AGAINST REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: GUIDELINES FOR
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 109 (2003) (noting that the "1951 Refugee Convention caters to all
persons fleeing persecution, without any distinction premised on their socially defined gender
roles.").
8. James Hathaway, Is There a Subjective Element in the Refugee Convention 's Requirement of
"Well-Founded Fear?", 26 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 505, 510 (2005) [hereinafter Hathaway, Well-
Founded Fear] ("The dominant view worldwide is that the test for well-founded fear is comprised of
two essential elements. This bipartite approach requires the applicant to demonstrate a significant,
actual risk of being persecuted.., as well as an emotional state of trepidation with respect to that
risk ... ").
9. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCP/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (1979)
(reedited 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]. The UNHCR is the body charged with
overseeing the implementation of the Convention. Convention, supra note 1, art. 35.
10. Saleh v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1992); Canada (Att'y Gen.) v.
Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 691; Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1988] A.C. 958
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.); Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, [2001]
H.C.A. 22 (Austl.); Zgnat'ev v. Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform, [2001] I.E.H.C. 70
(Ir.); Luu the Truong v. Chairman of the Refugee Status Review Bd., [2001] H.C.A.L. 3261, 45
(H.K.), available at http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/judgment.jsp.
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mind, the protections of the Convention are thus restricted to those
applicants who have the ability to conceive a subjective apprehension and
who are able to consistently and credibly articulate their state of mind.
While all applicants face difficulties in establishing their subjective
apprehension," the harm of requiring a subjective apprehension element
within the well-founded fear analysis is exacerbated in the case of child
refugee applicants. Requiring children, including infants, to demonstrate
their subjective apprehension to a decision maker creates a barrier to
effective protection that many children are unable to surmount.' 2  The
difficulties and sometimes the inability of child refugee applicants to satisfy
the subjective apprehension element of the well-founded fear analysis has
been recognized implicitly and explicitly through administrative guidelines
in Canada, 3 the United States,' 4 the UNHCR, 5 and through the actions of
decision makers. This recognition has given child refugee applicants a
procedural exemption from the subjective apprehension requirement.16
However, this procedural exemption is not sufficient. In order to guarantee
that child refugee applicants are not denied refugee protection because of
their inability to conceive or to articulate their subjective apprehension, this
Article argues that the procedural exemption be strengthened and formalized
11. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 517. Hathaway explains that:
it is generally difficult, if not impossible, for decisionmakers to determine in a formal
hearing process whether an applicant is genuinely fearful or not. The bipartite approach
clearly assumes the ability of decisionmakers accurately and reliably to ascertain whether
an applicant is subjectively fearful. The crude investigative tools available to
decisionmakers, however, are often ill-suited to unraveling the mysteries of an
applicant's psyche. The analysis of a person's emotional state-an inherently
problematic exercise even in the best of circumstances-is especially difficult in the
context of refugee law. Indeed, the subjective fear inquiry is so difficult and fraught with
uncertainty that erroneous determinations are virtually assured. This is especially true
where an effort is made to assess subjective fear based on an applicant's outward
demeanor and the content of his or her testimony.
Id. (citing Andjongo v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 12341, HX 7491/94 (Immigr. App.
Trib. 1995) (U.K.)); see also Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Reconsidering the Criteria for Assessing Well-
Founded Fear in Refugee Law, 25 MAN. L.J. 127, 131 (1997) (arguing that some applicants "may
not 'appear fearful' enough for ... decision-makers [who are] measuring [their] emotional reaction
against a Western male standard ... ").
12. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
13. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guidelines Concerning Child Refugee
Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues (Sept. 30, 1996) , available at http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/childe.htm [hereinafter Child Refugee Guidelines].
14. Memorandum from Jeff Weiss, Acting Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of Justice Immigration & Naturalization Service, to Asylum Officers, Immigration Officers, &
Headquarters Coordinators, Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims [File No. 120/11.26] (Dec. 10,
1998), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/10aChldrnGdlns.pdf [hereinafter
INS Guidelines].
15. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9.
16. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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into a singular objective risk test by the UNHCR and across all jurisdictions
that are signatories to the Convention and Protocol.
Part II of this Article describes the origins of the well-founded fear
analysis and the adoption of the objective risk plus subjective apprehension
approach.' 7  Part III examines the effect of the subjective apprehension
requirement on all refugees."8 Part IV focuses on the impact that the
subjective apprehension requirement has on child refugee applicants.' 9 Part
V examines the procedural exemption that currently exists for child refugee
applicants.2 ° Part VI illustrates the failure of the procedural exemption
approach and discusses the need to formalize the singular objective risk test
for child refugee applicants.2' Part VII highlights the benefits of the singular
objective risk approach.2 2 Finally, this Article concludes that formalizing
the procedural exemption approach into a singular objective risk test for
child refugee applicants under the well-founded fear analysis is necessary in
order to ensure effective protection under the Convention and Protocol. This
modification is actually consistent with what the UNHCR, Canada, the
United States, and many decision makers are currently doing in their refugee
status determinations. 23  Under the current well-founded fear analysis
framework, the risk facing child refugee applicants of denial of effective
protection simply because decision makers did not "see" their subjective fear
despite the objective risk element is just too great.
II. THE WELL-FOUNDED FEAR REQUIREMENT OF THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
In order to understand why the subjective apprehension element should
be eliminated for child refugee applicants, it is necessary to review briefly
why the subjective apprehension element is even part of the well-founded
fear analysis in the first place.
17. See discussion infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra notes 50-96 and accompanying text.
19. See discussion infra notes 97-131 and accompanying text.
20. See discussion infra notes 132-77 and accompanying text.
21. See discussion infra notes 178-226 and accompanying text.
22. See discussion infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
23. See discussion infra Part V.
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A. The Origins of the Well-Founded Fear Analysis
The focus of many refugee status determinations is on the phrase "well-
founded fear.",24  Generally, well-founded fear has been interpreted to
contain two parts: objective risk plus subjective apprehension. 5 Therefore,
in most jurisdictions, in order to have a well-founded fear under the
Convention, applicants for refugee status must establish that an objective
risk based on their civil or political status exists in the country from which
they fled,26 and that they subjectively have this fear in their minds.
This dualistic interpretation of well-founded fear can be traced back to
the predecessor of the Convention: the Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization (IRO).' Like its modem counterpart, the IRO
definition of a refugee contained two parts.2 8  The first part, which had a
more objective focus, included persons who expressed "valid reasons" for
not wanting to return to their country of origin, including "[p]ersecution, or
fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution .... ,29 The second part of
the IRO definition included a subjective element in that it recognized
"factors in the attitude of the individual himself."3
The dualistic approach used in the IRO for the definition of a refugee
was the starting point for the drafters of the refugee definition in the
Convention.' The phrase well-founded fear is "a technical term, evolved by
the drafters of the Refugee Convention from the clumsy phrase 'persecution,
or fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution' employed in Part I,
section C, of Annex I to the IRO Constitution., 32 From this starting point,
and also from a very normative and definitional understanding of the word
24. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, part 1, ch. 2(B)(2)(a)(37) ("The phrase 'well-founded
fear of being persecuted' is the key phrase of the [refugee] definition.").
25. See sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text.
26. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 511.
27. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Dec. 15, 1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter IRO Constitution].
28. See discussion supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
29. IRO Constitution, supra note 27, annex 1, pt. 1, sec. C(1)(a)(i). See generally HATHAWAY,
REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 3, at 66 (explaining that the IRO "had competence over persons who
had already suffered persecution in their home state, as well as over persons judged by the
administering authorities to face a prospective risk of persecution were they to be returned to their
own country.").
30. HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 3, at 67 (citing Statement of Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/527 at 7 (1949)).
31. Louis Henkin, Statement to the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems,
U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.5 (Jan. 19, 1950) ("The General Assembly had envisaged a definition of
refugees corresponding to that contained in the Constitution of the IRO, on the understanding that
that definition must be static .... ").
32. 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 1N INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (1966).
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"fear,, 33 decision makers in jurisdictions all over the world began to evaluate
refugee applicants from an objective risk plus subjective apprehension
approach when analyzing an applicant's well-founded fear.34
B. The Adoption of the Objective Risk Plus Subjective Apprehension
Approach
The use of the objective risk plus subjective apprehension analysis is
common across many jurisdictions, including the United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, and Hong Kong.3 5 In United States
jurisprudence, the objective risk plus subjective apprehension approach
slipped in through the back door in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.36 In that case,
the Supreme Court debated whether the standard of proof governing asylum
applications was the same as the standard of proof for withholding of
deportation. 37  The focus of Cardoza-Fonseca was not on the elements
33. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 506 (noting that "[d]iscussions related to
the subjective element [of well-founded fear] frequently resort to indefinite language, itself
susceptible to multiple interpretations.").
34. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10.
35. See sources cited supra note 10.
36. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
37. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423-24. The Court's argument went as follows:
Since 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act has provided two methods through
which an otherwise deportable alien who claims that he will be persecuted if deported can
seek relief. Section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), requires the Attorney General
to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his "life or freedom would be
threatened" on account of one of the listed factors if he is deported. In INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407 (1984), we held that to qualify for this entitlement to withholding of
deportation, an alien must demonstrate that 'it is more likely than not that the alien would
be subject to persecution' in the country to which he would be returned. The Refugee
Act of 1980 also established a second type of broader relief. Section 208(a) of the Act
authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is
unable or unwilling to return to his home country 'because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.'
In Stevic, we rejected an alien's contention that the § 208(a) 'well-founded fear'
standard governs applications for withholding of deportation under § 243(h). Similarly
today we reject the Government's contention that the §243(h) standard, which requires an
alien to show that he is more likely than not to be subject to persecution, governs
applications for asylum under §208(a). Congress used different, broader language to
define the term 'refugee' as used in §208(a) than it used to describe the class of aliens
who have a right to withholding of deportation under §243(h). The Act's establishment
of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a
narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the country
where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the
defining well-founded fear itself.3t Since the elements of well-founded fear
were not the focus of the case, the Supreme Court did not do an in-depth
analysis regarding the requirements of well-founded fear.39 Unfortunately,
this cursory approach resulted in the Supreme Court simply focusing on the
plain meaning or dictionary definition of the word "fear., 40  As Justice
Blackmun stated in his concurrence, "the very language of the term 'well-
founded fear' demands a particular type of analysis-an examination of the
subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum coupled with an inquiry into
the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear.' ' 1 This objective
risk plus subjective apprehension approach was soon fully adopted and
relied upon by United States decision makers after its initial appearance in
Cardoza-Fonseca.42
Around the same time, Canada's highest court adopted a similar
objective risk plus subjective apprehension approach in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Ward.43  In Ward, the Canadian Supreme Court defined well-
founded fear as a bipartite test: "(1) the claimant must subjectively fear
persecution; and (2) this fear must be well-founded in an objective sense.' 4
The Ward court was adopting a test from an earlier case, Rajudeen v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),45 in which the Court
observed that "[tihe subjective component relates to the existence of the fear
of persecution in the mind of the refugee. The objective component requires
Refugee Act of 1980. In addition, the legislative history of the 1980 Act makes it
perfectly clear that Congress did not intend the class of aliens who qualify as refugees to
be coextensive with the class who qualify for §243(h) relief.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. See infra note 40.
40. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31 (stating that "the reference to 'fear' in the § 208(a)
standard [the well-founded fear standard] obviously makes the eligibility determination turn to some
extent on the subjective mental state of the alien."). In making this statement, the Supreme
Court looked to a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, noting that "[t]he BIA agrees that
the term 'fear,' as used in this statute, refers to 'a subjective condition, an emotion characterized by
the anticipation or awareness of danger."' Id. at 431 n. II (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., Saleh v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that a
well-founded fear must be both subjectively and objectively reasonable, and that "[t]he applicant
must show that he has a subjective fear of persecution, and that the fear is grounded in objective
facts"); Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the well-
founded fear standard requires that the fear be "subjectively genuine" and have a sufficient basis in
reality to be "objectively reasonable"); Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 79-80 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding
that "[i]t is only after objective evidence sufficient to suggest a risk of persecution has been
introduced that the alien's subjective fears and desire to avoid the risk-laden situation in his or her
native land become relevant") (citations omitted).
43. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
44. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 723.
45. [1985] 55 N.R. 129 (Can.).
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that the refugee's fear be evaluated objectively to determine if there is a
valid basis for that fear.
'
,
46
In addition to the jurisdictions that use the objective risk plus subjective
apprehension approach, the UNHCR also advocates the use of the two part
test in the well-founded fear analysis. 47 Like the United States Supreme
Court, the UNHCR also analyzes well-founded fear by focusing on the word
"fear" itself.48 From this definitional understanding of the word fear, the
UNHCR directs the signatories to the Convention to use the objective risk
plus subjective apprehension approach:
[t]o the element of fear-a state of mind and a subjective
condition-is added the qualification 'well-founded'. This implies
that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concemed that
determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be
supported by an objective situation. The term 'well-founded fear'
therefore contains a subjective and an objective element, and in
determining whether well-founded fear exists, both elements must
be taken into consideration.49
By relying on a definitional analysis to reach the objective risk plus
subjective apprehension approach, the UNHCR is consistent with the
bipartite approach used in most countries.
III. ANALYZING THE SUBJECTIVE APPREHENSION ELEMENT OF WELL-
FOUNDED FEAR
A. Potential Benefits
The inclusion of a subjective apprehension element within well-founded
fear may have some potential benefits. The existence of a subjective
element within the well-founded fear analysis may allow the refugee status
determination process to be more personal and individualized, by allowing
the refugee applicant a venue for conveying his or her reaction to the
persecution that he or she faced. More importantly, the use of subjective
46. Rajudeen, [1985] 55 N.R. at 134.
47. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
48. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 37 ("Since fear is subjective, the definition
involves a subjective element in the person applying for recognition as a refugee.").
49. Id. 38.
543
apprehension may also give decision makers the discretion they need to
grant asylum to refugees who are fleeing from situations in which the
existence of objective evidence is minimal, although subjective
apprehension alone is generally not enough to satisfy the well-founded fear
analysis. °
B. A Possible Barrier to Refugee Protection
Unfortunately, the potential benefits of including subjective
apprehension within the well-founded fear analysis do not outweigh the
serious harm that can occur. The subjective apprehension element creates
difficulties and possibly even a barrier to protection for all refugees, but
especially for children.
1. Difficulties in Identifying and Articulating State of Mind
All refugees are faced with the inherent difficulty of defining,
identifying, and articulating their subjective apprehension. To have
subjective apprehension requires not only capacity to know and actual
knowledge of an objective risk, but also the ability to articulate coherently
and credibly these feelings of fear about the objective risk to the decision
maker.5 This articulation is often extremely difficult due to cultural,52
50. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 510-11 (noting that "most courts require
evidence of objective risk as well, and therefore decline to find that trepidation [subjective
apprehension] alone is sufficient to engage the Convention obligations of States"); see also Chan v.
Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, 664 (noting that "the existence of a subjective fear of persecutory
treatment is not sufficient to meet the statutory definition of a Convention refugee.... the Board
[must be able to] conclude not only that the fear existed in the mind of the claimant but also that it
was objectively well-founded"); Gonahasa v. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"mere irrational apprehension is insufficient" to satisfy the well-founded fear analysis).
51. See generally Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 510-11; see also discussion
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
52. See Janet Bauer, Speaking of Culture: Immigrants in the American Legal System, in
IMMIGRANTS IN COURT 17 (1999) ("In legal proceedings, difference in narrative styles can affect
the credibility of immigrants. Across cultures, patterns of storytelling, preference for the importance
of different attributes, sequencing order, and ways of connecting events or features differ. Most
Americans favor linear plots in storytelling or construction of narratives. In many other cultures, the
main points may be obscured or arrived at in a more circular fashion after connecting what appear to
be inconsistent or unrelated elements") (citing MICHAEL COLE & SYLVIA SCRIBNER, CULTURE AND
THOUGHT: ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION (1974)); Beate Anna Oft, International and US.
Obligations Toward Stowaway Asylum Seekers, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 308-10 (1991) (explaining
how cultural differences with regard to concepts of time, geography, family units, "common sense,"
and "verbal behavioral clues" affect credibility determinations of asylum seekers). See generally
Walter KUlin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum Hearing,
20 INT'L. MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986) (demonstrating "how [cultural] misunderstandings...
between the asylum-seeker[] and the [decision maker] ... can seriously distort the process of
communication" during the refugee status determination and "impair the ability of refugees ... [to
be found] credible.").
544
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educational, 3 and language differences5 4 between the refugee applicant and
the decision maker. Applicants, especially those who are suffering from
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may also struggle to convey their
subjective apprehension to decision makers due to the psychological effects
of previous persecution that they have suffered.55
In addition to the inherent difficulties of establishing a subjective
apprehension, the complete subjectivity and discretionary nature in
identifying subjective apprehension makes all refugee applicants vulnerable
to decision maker abuse during the well-founded fear analysis.5 6 Requiring
subjective apprehension to be a part of the well-founded fear analysis opens
the door to the possibility for decision makers to use a lack of subjective
apprehension as a reason for denial when objective risk has been
established.5 7 In other words, a refugee applicant could prove that he or she
is objectively at risk of persecution, but, if he or she fails to display a
subjective apprehension, protection would be denied. 8
53. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note II, at 133 (explaining that "in societies where gender
discrimination is systemic and sustained through the process of socialisation, women's exposure to
formal education, and hence their ability to clearly articulate a subjective fear of persecution, may be
very limited.").
54. Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 518-19 (explaining that "fearful applicants
forced to communicate through an interpreter may be seen to lack fear where their words and
expressions are translated in ways that fail fully to convey the extent of their trepidation"); Regina v.
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex Parte Patel, [1986] Imm. A.R. 208 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (Op. of
Webster, J.) ("Although the [doubts cast on demeanor evidence by MacKenna J.] . .. overstate the
difficulty of assessing the demeanour of a witness in an ordinary case, when the witness is English
speaking, they do not, I feel, overstate the difficulty and may even understate it ... when most, if not
all, of the witnesses would have to give evidence through an interpreter."); Adjin-Tettey, supra note
11, at 133 (stating that "language barriers may have a negative impact on a claimant's ability to
testify about her subjective fear.").
55. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 519-20 ("Persons suffering from PTSD
often do not exhibit outward signs of trepidation, but rather 'dissociate' themselves from their
reality .... All told, individuals suffering from PTSD may be among the most fearful asylum
applicants, yet they are acutely disadvantaged in their ability to communicate that trepidation to
decisionmakers."); Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 396 (2003) ("The
psychological effects of traumatic events can hamper a refugee's ability to communicate why he or
she is afraid to return home, and make it difficult for some of the most vulnerable refugees to
establish claims that would give them legal protection."); see also Adjin-Tettey, supra note 11, at
132 (explaining that PTSD can affect applicants' ability to testify).
56. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 534 (explaining that the mechanisms
designed by decision makers to validate subjective apprehension are in the best cases unreliable and
in the worst cases violate established protection principles).
57. Seeid. at514.
58. Id. ("The inescapable, and deeply unsatisfying, consequence of the insistence on proof of
trepidation is that an applicant found not to be fearful must be denied refugee status, despite a
545
Identifying and analyzing subjective apprehension is difficult in refugee
status determinations because it refers to a state of mind, and it is not
common vernacular to speak in terms of "fear of persecution." There is an
added difficulty in that many refugee applicants have been persecuted by
figures of authority and may be reluctant to enunciate their fears to
authorities in the asylum country. 9 The UNHCR has acknowledged this
difficulty in refugee status determinations, admitting that
[t]he expressions "fear of persecution" or even "persecution" are
usually foreign to a refugee's normal vocabulary. A refugee will
indeed only rarely invoke "fear of persecution" in these terms,
though it will often be implicit in his story. Again, while a refugee
may have very definite opinions for which he has had to suffer, he
may not, for psychological reasons, be able to describe his
experiences and situation in political terms. 60
Later in the handbook, the UNHCR further cautions decision makers that,
"[a] person who, because of his experiences, was in fear of the authorities in
his own country may still feel apprehensive vis-A-vis any authority. He may
therefore be afraid to speak freely and give a full and accurate account of his
case." 6I Decision makers have also recognized these difficulties. 62 In Spain,
the Supreme Tribunal has stated that "the subjective situation of fear [is]
difficult to establish since it refers to a state of mind., 63 Similarly, in Chan
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),64 the Supreme Court
of Canada acknowledged that determining an applicant's subjective fear is
an "intricate task," especially when the evidence is ambiguous.
65
finding that he or she faces a real chance of being persecuted if returned to the country of origin.")
(emphasis added).
59. See Philip G. Schrag & Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a Model of Fair
Procedure, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 267, 287 (1997) ("Many arriving refugees are very reluctant to
reveal the truth about why they fled their home countries, particularly to a uniformed INS officer.
Victims of human rights abuses do not understand the American legal system and are afraid to talk
about the fact that they were persecuted by their government to officials of another government.").
60. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 46.
61. Id. 198,
62. See discussion infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
63. Carlos Pefia Galiano, Spain, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? 351 (Jean-Yves Carlier et al. eds., 1997)
(quoting STS, Jan. 29, 1988 (R.J., No. 514, p. 520)). Despite acknowledging the inherent difficulty
in ruling on a person's state of mind, the same Spanish court in a later case increased the reliance it
placed on the subjective element of well-founded fear. Id. at 353.
64. [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593.
65. Chan, [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 637.
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2. Potential for Decision Maker Abuse
Due to the difficulties in identifying subjective apprehension, requiring
that it be part of the well-founded fear analysis opens the door to possible
abuse (or, at the very least, misapplication) by decision makers. Since the
existence of a particular state of mind is difficult to ascertain and may be
hard for refugee applicants to enunciate, the subjective apprehension
element is an area where decision makers often find doubt about the veracity
of the refugee applicant's claim.66 Absent an affirmative declaration by the
applicant of a subjective apprehension of persecution, decision makers can
isolate and parse out the refugee applicant's statements in order to create
doubt about whether the applicant has a subjective apprehension, even when
sufficient objective risk evidence exists.67
The applicant in Chan faced this exact dilemma. 6' He was a male from
China who claimed he feared he would be forcibly sterilized if returned to
China.69 The applicant lost his appeal, and a significant portion of both the
majority and dissenting opinion is focused on the existence or absence of
subjective fear. 70 The majority did not find sufficient evidence to support a
finding of subjective apprehension. 7' However, in his dissent, Justice La
Forest found enough evidence on the record to support a finding of
subjective apprehension, specifically:
appellant twice noticeably constrained his testimony in regard to the
anger and abuse of the PSB [Public Security Bureau] directed at the
appellant and his family for violating the birth control policy,
stating that it "would be very difficult for me to tell you in detail"
and that "for me it's very hard to say out loud." The appellant's
reluctance to speak at such a crucial stage of his testimony-and the
lack of intervention on the part of the Board, when faced with the
appellant's hesitation, to invite him to articulate his experiences
fully-would, if one gives credence to the UNHCR Handbook,
72appear not uncommon in a refugee hearing.
66. See generally id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 605
69. Id.
70. See id. at 594-95, 638.
71. Id. at 664 (finding that "the evidence of the appellant with respect to his subjective fear... is
equivocal at best.").
72. Id. at 638.
Justice La Forest further stated that, in light of the realities of refugee
hearings73 and given the problems with the translation record, he saw
little merit in isolating portions of the appellant's responses in order
to highlight possible prevarication. The appellant's testimony must,
as the [UNHCR] Handbook instructs us, be read in context in its
entirety with some allowance for the translation errors that certainly
occurred in the appellant's answers and quite possibly in the
translation of the Board questions. Viewed in this light, the
appellant's testimony does not seem to be particularly equivocal.74
The majority opinion, however, rejects the approach advocated by the
UNHCR Handbook and found merit in doing exactly what Justice La Forest
rejected: isolating portions of the appellant's response in order to cast doubt
on whether the applicant had a subjective apprehension of persecution." In
the majority opinion, Justice Major stated that "appellant's testimony, even
with respect to his own fear of forced sterilization, was equivocal and
inconsistent at times, 76 and then proceeded to isolate a portion of
appellant's responses.7 7 Justice Major was particularly focused on the fact
that the applicant did not specifically mention fear of forced sterilization
when asked what would happen if appellant were returned to China. 8 The
testimony of applicant Chan that Justice Major found to be equivocal on
subjective apprehension was: "[i]f I going back to China, the most possible
thing would be arrest, put in jail. Could also be unemployed for the rest of
my whole life, and could not earn a living. If talking something more
serious, then I probably will be murdered."7 9  Admittedly, Chan did not
explicitly state that he feared persecution through the use of forced
sterilization or even that he feared forced sterilization; ° however, the
73. Id. at 637-38 (noting that "[a]dding to the obstacles preventing a rapid determination of the
appellant's subjective fear is the evidence, apparent upon an examination of the written record, that
in at least two instances, the appellant was unwilling to state or elaborate upon certain information, a
phenomenon not at all uncommon to refugee claimants from other cultures.").
74. Id. at 638-39.
75. Id. at 664. The majority did not rule on whether the applicant had a subjective apprehension
of forced sterilization, stating that:
the evidence of the appellant with respect to his subjective fear of forced sterilization is
equivocal at best. However, in the absence of an explicit finding by the Board on this
point, it would not be appropriate for this Court to determine that the appellant did not
have a subjective fear of forced sterilization.
Id.
76. Id. at 663.
77. Id. at 663-64.
78. Id. at 663 (noting that "[w]hen asked specifically what would happen if he were to return to
China, the appellant made no mention of forced sterilization.").
79. Id. at 664.
80. See discussion supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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reasons he may not have mentioned this fear are numerous, including
language, accuracy of translation, educational, and cultural barriers.
Alternatively, the applicant may not have mentioned that he feared
sterilization specifically if returned because he did mention fearing things
that are equally serious or even more serious, such as murder.8' Or perhaps
he simply failed to mention his fear because he thought that the outcome was
obvious to the court. 2 Regardless of the motivations behind the applicant's
answer, the dissection of the answer by Justice Major shows one of the many
problems of using subjective apprehension as a part of the well-founded fear
analysis. Determining a person's state of mind is an arduous task even when
that person speaks the same language, shares the same culture, and has a
similar educational background as the decision maker. It can be practically
impossible when, as is the case in many refugee status determinations, the
applicant comes from a different cultural background and speaks a different
language than the decision maker.83
One of the intriguing aspects of Chan is the polar opposite approaches
taken by Justice La Forest and Justice Major.84 Both of them rely on similar
portions of the transcripts from the lower courts, but Justice La Forest,
recognizing the difficulty in identifying and analyzing subjective
apprehension, found in favor of the applicant, while Justice Major made an
adverse finding, seemingly not taking these difficulties into accountY.8  The
ability of Justice Major to simply ignore the cultural and language
differences possessed by the refugee applicant in Chan raises the issue of
whether Justice Major was using the difficulties within the subjective
apprehension element of well-founded fear as a way to deny protection to
someone who faced an objective risk of persecution.
Even if it did not occur in the Chan case, there is a real possibility of
decision makers using subjective apprehension as a barrier to refugee
protection when evidence of objective risk exists but subjective
apprehension is not as clear. This is one of the most disturbing ways
decision makers can abuse their judicial discretion in the well-founded fear
81. See discussion supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. Chan, [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 640 (noting that "[g]iven the considerable testimony the appellant
had already given concerning the mounting pressure upon him to submit to sterilization that resulted
in his ensuing flight from China, it is not really surprising that he did not again mention that he could
be sterilized if returned to that country.").
83. See supra note 54.
84. See supra notes 71-83 (displaying the disagreement between Justices La Forest and Major on
whether to isolate portions of appellant's responses in order to make a subjective fear
determination).
85. See id.
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analysis. Sadly, this scenario occurred in another Canadian case: that of a
refugee applicant named Osman.86 Osman fled to Canada from Somalia.87
His father, mother, and three sisters had been killed as a result of
government action." He himself had been imprisoned and maltreated for
five months, and was released only through the payment of a bribe.8 9 The
Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board (Refugee Board) denied Osman's refugee application. 90 The
Refugee Board found that "the essential subjective element of fear of
persecution is missing, even though there is the substantial objective
evidence which would support the claimant's story."9' The Refugee Board
came to this conclusion because Osman, after being maltreated and
imprisoned, continued his government employment. 92 In setting aside the
decision of the Refugee Board, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal noted
that the Refugee Board seemed to ignore the fact that Osman only returned
to government employment after he was released from prison "because he
was ordered to do so.,,
93
Thankfully, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal recognized that
Osman was incorrectly denied protection as a result of the Refugee Board
misunderstanding and mischaracterizing the evidence of Osman's subjective
apprehension. 94 Specifically, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal found it
troublesome that the Refugee Board denied refugee protection to Osman due
to a lack of subjective apprehension, despite finding that substantial
objective evidence of risk existed.95 This finding was especially troubling
because the Refugee Board held that Osman lacked a subjective
apprehension simply because Osman returned to his job; when in fact, he
was forced to return by the government.96 Even though Osman was granted
relief at the appellate level, the initial findings of the Refugee Board
illustrate that decision makers can, and do, abuse their discretion and
undermine the protection goals of the Convention in situations where there
is no specific declaration by the applicant of a subjective fear of persecution,
despite the existence of substantial objective evidence to support an
applicant's claim of well-founded fear. Unfortunately, the inclusion of
86. Osman v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, No. A-300-91, 39 A.C.W.S. (3d) (F.C.
April 6, 1993), available at 1993 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 45911 (Can.).
87. See id.
88. Id. at **2.
89. Id.
90. Id. at **1.
91. Id.
92. Id. at **2.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at **3.
95. Id. at **1.
96. Id. at **2.
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subjective apprehension in the well-founded fear analysis allows decision
makers (like the Refugee Board in Osman) to thwart the goals of the
Convention and to deny applicants the protection to which they are entitled.
IV. CHILDREN AND THE SUBJECTIVE APPREHENSION ELEMENT OF WELL-
FOUNDED FEAR
The need for refugee protection knows no age limit,97 and children
constitute at least fifty percent of the total refugee population.9 8 Sadly,
children are uniquely vulnerable to being victims of human rights abuses.99
The international community has recognized this unique vulnerability, citing
situations such as sexual exploitation and underage military recruitment. °°
97. See supra note 6.
98. Women's Commission for Refugee Women & Children, Annual Report, at 15 (2004),
http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/annrep04.pdf [hereinafter Women's Commission, Annual
Report].
99. The international community has recognized this vulnerability. See generally Convention on
the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 23-26, U.N. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter
Convention on the Rights of the Child]. The Convention on the Rights of the Child states in part
that:
the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva Declaration
of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child
adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(in particular in articles 23 and 24), in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (in particular in article 10) and in the statutes and relevant
instruments of specialized agencies and international organizations concerned with the
welfare of children,
Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 'the
child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care,
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth',
Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to
the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
Adoption Nationally and Internationally; the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules); and the Declaration on the
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict,
Recognizing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in exceptionally
difficult conditions, and that such children need special consideration.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9; INS Guidelines, supra
note 14.
100. Global Consultations on International Protection, Refugee Children, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/02/9,
4 (Apr. 25, 2002) ("Separated children ... face a greater risk of sexual exploitation and abuse,
military recruitment, child labour, denial of access to education and basic assistance, and
detention."). Sexual exploitation "includes female infanticide; child marriage; female genital
mutilation; sexual abuse by family members and acquaintances; rape; sexual harassment and sexual
exploitation for access to protection, goods and services." Id. 10 n. 11.
The UNHCR has specifically highlighted the particular vulnerability of
separated'' and disabled refugee children.0 2
A. The Vulnerability of Children During Refugee Status Determinations
Unfortunately, a child's unique vulnerability does not end when he or
she applies for refugee status and appears before a decision maker. Child
refugee applicants, especially separated children, suffer the most in legal
systems, such as the United States, in which they are not entitled to legal
representation.'0 3 In the United States, separated children may be detained
indefinitely by immigration authorities, "in some cases for more than two
years, while their immigration status is resolved."' 4 While in detention,
they may be housed with juvenile offenders,'0 5 and are often shackled or
handcuffed when transported or produced in court. 10 6 Currently, over 5,000
separated minors are detained in the United States by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) every year. 10 7  Less than half of the detained
101. The term "separated children" refers to children "who are separated from both parents and
are not being cared for by any adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so." Id. 4 n.4.
These children are also sometimes referred to as "unaccompanied children," but the use of that term
has recently declined. Id.
102. See UNHCR Policy on Refugee Children, 19, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/82 (Aug. 6, 1993).
103. See Amnesty International USA, United States of America: Unaccompanied Children in
Immigration Detention, at 74 (2003),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/refugee/pdfs/childrendetention.pdf [hereinafter Unaccompanied
Children in Immigration Detention]. This report explains that
unaccompanied children in the United States are not provided with a lawyer or a guardian
ad litem (or FOC, "Friend of the Child") to help guide them through the complex U.S.
immigration system. This is of grave concern to Amnesty International. The legal
community within the U.S. has responded admirably to the need for pro bono
representation for unaccompanied children, creating networks of pro bono legal
representatives willing to represent these children. However, the networks are often
overwhelmed and underfunded, and in the event that a pro bono lawyer is not available
there is no guarantee that a child will be appointed an attorney.
Id. Compare the situation in the United States to Canada and the United Kingdom, where legal
representation is provided to unaccompanied minors either at government expense or through a pro
bono attorney. Sarah Maloney, TransAtlantic Workshop on Unaccompanied/Separated Children:
Comparative Policies & Practices in North America and Europe, 15 J. REFUGEE STUD. 102, 112-13
(2002).
104. Women's Commission for Refugee Women & Children, Prison Guard or Parent?: INS
Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee Children, at 9 (May 2002), available at
http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/insdet.pdf [hereinafter Women's Commission, Prison
Guard or Parent?].
105. Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Detention, supra note 103, at 23-24.
106. Id. at 35-36. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: U.S. DETENTION
OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY 33-40 (2004) [hereinafter IN LIBERTY'S
SHADOW] (highlighting the conditions of detention in the United States and its detrimental impact on
asylum seekers).
107. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 106, at 37.
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children in the United States have legal representation.0" This combination
of no legal representation and prolonged detention does not foster an
environment in which separated child refugee applicants feel safe to fully
articulate their asylum claims, let alone any subjective apprehension they
may possess.'0 9 In fact, because of these factors, separated children face an
uphill battle to gain refugee protection.110
Unlike separated children, child refugee applicants who arrive with a
parent or close family member do not have to face the asylum process alone.
However, they may face an even greater danger: that of being rendered
invisible.' Often, independent claims of children are not even
articulated."' In the United States, when a parent accompanies a child
refugee applicant, the child's claim is typically "subsumed under that of the
parent and [is] not considered separately.""' 3 Subsuming the child's refugee
application makes the child applicant extremely vulnerable. Such an
approach fails to recognize that the child may be facing persecution that is
different from the parents, or that the parents may be participating in, or at
least condoning, the persecution experienced by the child. Nor does it
108. Women's Commission, Prison Guard or Parent?, supra note 104, at 30.
109. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the Transnational
Migration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 269, 282 (2000) ("Where
unaccompanied minors are subject to harsh immigration control measures, such as threats of
removal, indefinite detention, or legal proceedings without access to professional representation,
their ability to articulate their views or bring best interest considerations to the attention of decision
makers is compromised.").
110. Jacqueline Bhabha, Demography and Rights: Women, Children, and Access To Asylum, 16
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 227, 238-39 (2004) [hereinafter Bhabha, Demography and Rights] (finding that
separated children are disadvantaged in being accorded the security of refugee status).
11. See Bhabha, Rights of Children, supra note 6, at 254 ("Whereas considerable attention had
been paid to the social welfare and tracing needs of child refugees living in camps or found
internally displaced and separated from their families, the legal and procedural obstacles facing child
asylum seekers were generally unacknowledged. It was assumed that children could be dealt with
under the procedures directed at families-that where the head of household or parent was eligible
for refugee protection, the child would be too; and that if protection was refused, arrangements for
the family would include the children. This set of assumptions was based on two largely
unquestioned premises: first, that child asylum seekers traveled within their families and could be
subsumed with the family asylum application, and second, that children could have no independent
claim to asylum in their own right over and above the family's claim."). See generally Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Refugee Children and Adolescents: A Progress
Report, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.19 (Oct. 1, 2001) (explaining that refugee children are often
"invisible" in policy making because refugees are often thought of as a uniform group and that there
is a tendency to think of refugee children simply as dependants of adults).
112. See, e.g., Alexandrova v. INS, No. 97-3932, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20612, at *3 (6th Cir.
Aug. 11, 1998) (per curiam) (noting that, despite independent claims by his wife and child, the father
"was the sole witness to testify. His testimony related solely to his own eligibility for asylum.").
113. Women's Commission, Prison Guard or Parent?, supra note 104, at 5.
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account for the fact that the child's claim may in fact be the strongest one for
asylum. 114
B. The Hurdle That Children Often Cannot Surmount
Both accompanied and separated child refugee applicants, like all other
refugee applicants, are required to establish subjective apprehension in order
to receive refugee protection.' 15 Unfortunately, the problems of articulating
subjective apprehension and the possibility of judicial abuse as highlighted
in Osman" 6 and Chan"1 7 above are only heightened in the context of child
refugee applicants. On top of the language, cultural, and educational
barriers present in almost all refugee status determinations, 18 children are
saddled with the additional burden of possibly being too young to conceive
of or to articulate a subjective apprehension, or too scared to express their
subjective apprehension to either their advocates or their decision makers. 1 9
Unlike adult refugee applicants, children may not understand the purpose or
goal of the refugee status determination and may therefore be reluctant to
testify to their subjective apprehension.
The difficulties child refugee applicants face in establishing subjective
apprehension are most apparent in the case of infants who are applying for
refugee status. In Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, the applicant was a male infant, only three and a half
years old. 2 0  He was a Chinese national born in Australia to Chinese
parents. 2 ' The infant applicant first applied for a protection visa as a
refugee (Australia's version of asylum) to the Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, then to the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal), then
to the Full Court of the Federal Court (Full Court), and finally to the High
Court of Australia (High Court). 2 2  The Tribunal found that the infant
114. Id.
115. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in
dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum § 8.6 (Feb. 1997), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdpftbl=PUBL&id=3d4f9l cf4 [hereinafter
UNHCR, Guidelines on Unaccompanied Children] (explaining that "the same definition of a refugee
applies to all individuals regardless of their age .... ").
116. See discussion supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
117. See discussion supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
118. See discussion supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Feng Chai Li v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, No. IMM-6303-99, 2001
Fed. Ct. Trial LEXIS 1182, at *6 (Can. Nov. 14, 2001) (finding that a "child claimant may not be
able to express a subjective fear of persecution in the same manner as an adult claimant.").
120. Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170 A.L.R. 553
(Austl.).
121. Id. 1. The applicant did not acquire Australian citizenship by reason of being born in
Australia. See Australian Citizenship Act, 1948, § 10(2).
122. Chen Shi Hai, 170 A.L.R. 1,9-10.
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applicant faced a real chance of persecution in China because of his
membership in a particular social group known as children "born outside the
parameters of [China's] One Child Policy ... [and] born of an unauthorised
marriage."' 23 The Tribunal and the Full Court realized the impossibility of
having the infant applicant articulate a subjective apprehension, so instead,
both the Tribunal and the Full Court imputed the fears of the applicant's
parents to him. 124 On its face, this approach of imputing a parent's fear to a
child applicant seems reasonable; however, it can have disastrous
consequences for the child applicant, as it did for the applicant in Chen Shi
Hai, who lost his case before the Tribunal and the Full Court simply because
his parents' cases failed. 125 However, on appeal, the High Court recognized
the error of the Tribunal and Full Court:
[t]he Tribunal correctly recognised the separate entitlement of the
appellant, although an infant, under the Convention and Australian
law. So did the primary judge and the dissenting judge in the Full
Court. Although the majority in the Full Court appear to have
accepted that it was appropriate and necessary to attribute the fears
of the parents to those of the child for refugee law purposes,
somewhat inconsistently, their Honours proceeded from this "very
obvious attitude to adopt" to remark that because the parents had
failed, so must the child.
2 6
Chen Shi Hai demonstrates that if a child or infant refugee applicant is
forced to accept the imputation of his or her parents' fears as his or her own,
there is a strong likelihood that the child's refugee status determination will
have the same outcome as the parents', even if this outcome impinges on the
child's rights under the Convention.
In Chen Shi Hai, the High Court was aware that children are often the
ones who need refugee protection the most, as Justice Kirby noted:
for the purposes of international refugee law, children are often
amongst the most vulnerable groups of refugees in special need of
the protection of the Convention. They sometimes arrive in a
country of refuge without parents or guardians. They are entitled to
123. Id. 6.
124. Id. 4 (holding that "it is accepted that [the infant applicant's] parents' fears on his behalf are
sufficient.").
125. Id. 76-10.
126. Id. 777.
the determination of their legal right, that fact notwithstanding. It
would be astonishing if the Convention did not apply to them
according to its plain language.27
However, it is almost impossible to think of how the plain language of the
Convention could apply to child refugee applicants if decision makers and
the UNHCR impute a subjective apprehension component to the language of
well-founded fear for child refugee applicants. Interestingly, Justice Kirby
declared that children are covered under the plain language of the
Convention, and criticized the decision made in both the Tribunal and the
Full Court where the subjective apprehension of the parents was imputed to
the infant applicant.128 Nevertheless, Justice Kirby admitted that "[i]n order
to make the Convention operate in the case of an infant, 'fear', twice
referred to in the definition, had to be attributed from the parents to the
child."' 129 Although Justice Kirby seemed to recognize the difficulty in
reconciling the objective risk plus subjective apprehension approach when
applying the Convention to children, he failed to offer an alternative method
of determining well-founded fear for child refugee applicants that is
consistent with the plain language of the Convention.'3 Justice Kirby
seemed satisfied in using the fear of the parents, as long as decision makers
do not, based on that imputation, deny the child applicant refugee status
simply because the parents' application fails. 3'
V. THE PROCEDURAL "EXEMPTION" FOR CHILDREN FROM THE SUBJECTIVE
APPREHENSION ELEMENT
Thankfully, the reality for child refugee applicants is currently not as
grim as it could be. The reality for most children is that the subjective
apprehension element is given a procedural nod while being substantively
ignored in many countries during refugee status determinations for
children. 3 2 By advocating for the weight of the analysis to be placed on
objective risk or by imputing the fear of the child's parent or caregiver, 33
the UNHCR and the governments of the United States and Canada have
implicitly (and arguably explicitly) given decision makers permission to
substantively ignore subjective apprehension during the status determination
127. Chen Shi Hai, 170 A.L.R. 7 76.
128. Id. 770.
129. Id. 53.
130. See id. $T 75-81.
131. See id.
132. See INS Guidelines, supra note 14; see also UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9; UNHCR,
Guidelines on Unaccompanied Children, supra note 115, at § 8.6.
133. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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of child refugee applicants. 3 4 This elimination or extreme marginalization
of the subjective apprehension element of well-founded fear occurs through
both governmental guidelines and decision maker discretion.
A. Administrative Guidelines: Canada, the United States and the UNHCR
In 1996, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board issued ground-
breaking guidelines called Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and
Evidentiary Issues.135 These guidelines recognized that refugee claims of
children needed to be treated with special concern because of the unique
vulnerability of children as applicants. 36 Canada was the first government
to issue such guidelines for child refugee applicants.
Guideline three states that, "[a] child claimant may not be able to
express a subjective fear of persecution in the same manner as an adult
claimant. Therefore, it may be necessary to put more weight on the
objective rather than the subjective elements of the claim."' 37 The Canadian
position is supported by a UNHCR document entitled Refugee Children:
Guidelines on Protection and Care, which "provides that where a child is
not mature enough to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the
same way as an adult 'it is necessary to examine in more detail objective
factors, such as the characteristics of the group the child left with[,] the
situation prevailing in the country of origin and the circumstances of family
members, inside or outside the country of origin.,'
38
Two years later, in 1998, the United States followed in the footsteps of
the Canadian Government when the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) 139 issued its Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims (INS
Guidelines).1 40 The INS Guidelines acknowledge that "[f]or child asylum
seekers... the balance between subjective fear and objective circumstances
may be more difficult for an adjudicator to assess" than in cases for adult
asylum seekers. 14  The INS Guidelines recognize that child refugee
134. See id.
135. See Child Refugee Guidelines, supra note 13.
136. Id.
137. Id. at Guideline 3(B)(1I)(2).
138. See id. at n.27 (quoting U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, Preface to REFUGEE CHILDREN:
GUIDELINES ON PROTECTION AND CARE (1994)).
139. On March 1, 2003, The Homeland Security Act abolished the INS and all of its services and
functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See 6 U.S.C.A. § 291(a)
(West Supp. 2005); Homeland Security Act, H.R. Res. 5005, 107th Cong. § 471 (2002).
140. INS Guidelines, supra note 14.
141. Id. at 19.
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applicants "may be less forthcoming than adults, and may hesitate to talk
about past experiences in order not to relive their trauma."' 142 In light of
these difficulties, the INS Guidelines encourage decision makers to rely on
the guidance found in the UNHCR Handbook regarding child refugee
applicants. 43  The INS Guidelines quote the UNHCR Handbook and
"suggest[] that children under the age of [sixteen] may lack the maturity to
form a well-founded fear of persecution, thus requiring the [decision maker]
to give more weight to [the] objective factors."' 44 In fact, both the INS
Guidelines and the UNHCR Handbook recognize that, in trying to evaluate
subjective apprehension, there really cannot be a bright line rule; also, they
note that "a minor's mental maturity must normally be determined in the
light of his [or her] personal, family and cultural background.' 45
When decision makers are trying to identify whether a child refugee
applicant has a subjective apprehension, the INS Guidelines encourage them
to look beyond what the child refugee applicant has expressed. 146 The INS
Guidelines tell decision makers to look at "the circumstance[] of [the]
child's arrival in the United States ... [for] clues [as] to whether the child
has a well-founded fear of persecution." 14' The INS Guidelines further state
that "[i]f the child arrives in the company of other asylum seekers who have
been found to have a well-founded fear of persecution, this may, depending
on the circumstances, help to establish that the child's fear is well-
founded."'
148
In analyzing the subjective apprehension in child refugee applicants,
United States decision makers are also told "to look [at] the circumstance[]
of the parents and other family members, including their situation in the
child's country of origin.' ' 149  The mistreatment of a child's family, for
example, can thus support a well-founded fear. 50 The UNHCR Handbook
also advocates this approach. 5'
Both the INS Guidelines and the UNHCR Handbook are even willing to
accept a parent's desire to send the child outside the country of origin in
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id. at2-4, 19.
144. Id. at 19 (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 7 215, 217) ("Minors under 16 years of
age... may have fear and a will of their own, but these may not have the same significance as in the
case of an adult.")
145. INS Guidelines, supra note 14, at 19 (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 216).
146. Id. at 19-20.
147. Id. at 20.
148. Id.; UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 218; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(B) (2005).
149. INS Guidelines, supra note 14, at 20 (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 218).
150. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626-27 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that evidence
of mistreatment of one's family is probative of a threat to the applicant).
151. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 218.
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place of a child's ability to articulate a subjective apprehension. 5 2  The
UNHCR Handbook states that "[i]f there is reason to believe that the parents
wish their child to be outside the country of origin on grounds of well-
founded fear of persecution, the child himself may be presumed to have such
fear."'5 However, it continues,
[i]f the will of the parents cannot be ascertained or if [the] will [of
the parents] . . . [is] in conflict with the will of the child," the
decision maker "will have to come to a decision as to the well-
foundedness of the minor's fear on the basis of all the known
circumstances, which may call for a liberal application of the
benefit of the doubt.'
54
In addition to the guidance found in the UNHCR Handbook, the UNHCR
has reiterated its position on the difficulty children have in establishing well-
founded fear; specifically the subjective apprehension element and the need
to focus predominantly on objective factors in its Guidelines on Policies and
Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum.1
55
Specifically, the UNHCR states that
[a]lthough the same definition of a refugee applies to all individuals
regardless of their age, in the examination of the factual elements of
the claim of an unaccompanied child, particular regard should be
given to circumstances such as the child's stage of development,
his/her possibly limited knowledge of conditions in the country of
origin, and their significance to the legal concept of refugee status,
as well as his/her special vulnerability. Children may manifest their
fears in ways different from adults. Therefore, in the examination
of their claims, it may be necessary to have greater regard to certain
objective factors, and to determine, based upon these factors,
whether a child may be presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution. 156
In summary, the above approaches advocated by governmental
guidelines and the UNHCR include: (1) putting more weight on objective
factors, (2) using the circumstances of the child's arrival, (3) using the
152. See id.; INS Guidelines, supra note 14, at 20.
153. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9,1 218.
154. Id. 219. See INS Guidelines, supra note 14, at 20.
155. UNHCR, Guidelines on Unaccompanied Children, supra note 115.
156. Id. 8.6.
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circumstance of the child's parents or other family members in the country
of origin, (4) using the outcomes of other applicants refugee status
determinations, (5) imputing the parent's desire to send the child outside the
country of origin as the child's subjective apprehension, and (6) applying a
liberal benefit of the doubt for child refugee applicants. These factors, taken
together, effectively eliminate the subjective apprehension element
requirement for children.
B. Decision Maker Discretion
Governmental agencies and the UNHCR are not the only entities that
are effectively exempting children from the subjective apprehension
requirement of the well-founded fear analysis.' 57 Subjective apprehension is
also being done away with through the discretion of decision makers. 5 '
Arguably, decision makers quietly use their discretion to ignore the
subjective apprehension requirement in this manner frequently, with no
mention of it in their decisions. However, a few courts in Canada, 59
Australia, 160 and the United Kingdom 16' have explicitly declared that
children should be exempted from the subjective apprehension element of
well-founded fear.
In Yusuf v. Canada, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals noted the
irrationality of using the absence of the subjective apprehension element of
well-founded fear as a reason to deny protection to a child refugee applicant
who establishes objective risk.162 Justice Hugessen, writing for the court,
stated that
I am loath to believe that a refugee status claim could be dismissed
solely on the ground that as the claimant is a young child or a
person suffering from a mental disability, he or she was incapable
of experiencing fear the reasons for which clearly exist in objective
terms. 1
63
In Yusuf, the court granted a re-hearing on the appeal from the applicant,
finding it "hard to see in what circumstances it could be said that a person
who, we must not forget, is by definition claiming refugee status could be
157. See discussion infra notes 158-171 and accompanying text.
158. See id.
159. E.g., Yusufv. Canada, [1992] F.C. 629 (Can.).
160. E.g., Raza v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) F.C.A. 350 (Austl.).
161. E.g., R (on the application of Osmani) v. An Immigration Adjudicator & Another, [2001]
EWHC (Admin) 1087, [1]-[15] (Eng.).
162. Yusuf [1992] F.C. at 632.
163. Id.
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right in fearing persecution and still be rejected because it is said that fear
does not actually exist in his conscience. ' 64
Similarly, in Raza v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
the Federal Court of Australia discussed the findings a Tribunal must make
when analyzing well-founded fear. 165 In an unreported judgment, the court
stated that "[t]his [analysis] requires the Tribunal to be satisfied that there is
a subjective fear and an objective basis for [the well-founded fear]. Absent
any subjective fear then (infants and incapable persons apart) there can be no
question whether there is a well-founded fear.' ' 166 By making this statement,
the Raza court acknowledged the reality that infants and incapable persons
cannot enunciate or perhaps may not even have the capacity to form a
subjective apprehension; therefore the Raza court explicitly exempted those
individuals from the subjective apprehension requirement. 167
In R (on the application of Osmani) v. An Immigration Adjudicator and
Another, a decision from the United Kingdom, the court reviewed a claim
from a separated minor from Yugoslavia.1 68 While the United Kingdom
does not have specific guidelines for claims of refugee children like Canada
and the United States do, 169 the court handled the case in a manner which
reflected that it was aware of the unique issues that child refugee applicants
face, especially regarding establishing the subjective apprehension element
of well-founded fear. The court acknowledged that a person at any age may
qualify for refugee status, but then added:
however, account should be taken of the applicant's maturity and in
assessing the claim of a child more weight should be given to the
objective indications of risk than to the child's state of mind and
understanding of the situation. Further that [the asylum claim]
should not be refused solely because the child is too young to
understand the situation to have formed a well-founded fear of
persecution. "0
Even when decision makers are not trying to be as explicit as those in
Raza, Yusuf, and Osmani, the absence of discussion regarding capacity in
164. Id.
165. Raza (2002) F.C.A. 350, 1 7.
166. Id. at 7.
167. See id.
168. R (on the application of Osmani) v. An Immigration Adjudicator & Another, [2001] EWHC
(Admin) 1087, [1]-[15] (Eng.).
169. See discussion supra Part V.A.
170. Osmani, [2001] EWHC (Admin), 4 (emphasis added).
asylum decisions speaks volumes regarding the implicit exemption being
given to child refugee applicants. If decision makers were truly requiring all
child refugee applicants to establish a subjective apprehension, presumably
the issue of whether the child refugee applicant has the capacity to form or
articulate a subjective apprehension would be written about in numerous
decisions; however, it is not. This lack of discussion regarding capacity is
further evidence that in the majority of cases, child refugee applicants are
being given a free pass on the subjective apprehension element of the well-
founded fear analysis.
Much ink was spilled in early 2000 in the United States regarding the
capacity of a six-year-old child to apply for asylum.171  In Gonzalez v.
Reno, 7 2 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the governmental
policy that six-year-old children lack the capacity to assert an asylum claim
on their own. 173  Ironically, despite both the national and international
coverage and the role of the United States government in Gonzalez, child
refugee applicants of all ages, including infants, are still presumed to have
the capacity both to have and to articulate a subjective apprehension. 74 It
seems, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, that young children do not have the
capacity to assert their own asylum claim, 75 but if somehow that claim is
asserted for them or arguably if the applicant is at least seven years old and
asserts his or her own claim, then the young child must be able to know and
articulate his or her subjective apprehension in order to prevail on his or her
asylum claim. 176 This result is absurd, and illustrates that this is not the
reality for children in refugee status determinations. Decision makers are
not writing about or considering whether a child refugee applicant has the
capacity to formulate or enunciate a subjective apprehension, because
whether it is through the imputation of parental fears, evaluating the actions
of similarly situated persons, or only giving weight to the objective risk
171. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (1 th Cir. 2000).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1351.
174. This can be seen by the fact that no government nor the UNHCR has explicitly exempted a
child of any age from the subjective apprehension requirement. See discussion infra notes 221-22
and accompanying text.
175. Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1349-50. The court affirmed the INS policy, which stated that:
(1) six-year-old children lack the capacity to sign and to submit personally an application
for asylum; (2) instead, six-year-old children must be represented by an adult in
immigration matters; (3) absent special circumstances, the only proper adult to represent
a six-year-old child is the child's parent, even when the parent is not in this country; and,
(4) that the parent lives in a communist-totalitarian state (such as Cuba), in and of itself,
does not constitute a special circumstance requiring the selection of a non-parental
representative.
Id.
176. This can be inferred by the six-year-old limit articulated in the INS policy as paraphrased in
the Gonzalez case. See id.
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faced by the child, 7 ' in most cases decision makers are not requiring child
refugee applicants to formulate and articulate a subjective apprehension.
Through guidance issued by the UNHCR, guidelines issued by the
United States and Canada, and through decision maker discretion in
numerous jurisdictions, children have been procedurally exempted from the
subjective apprehension element of the well-founded fear analysis. Why the
UNHCR, governments, and decision makers have not simply announced that
subjective apprehension should not be a part of the well-founded fear
analysis, at least in the case of child refugee applicants, is simply because
they have elevated form over substance. Unfortunately, for vulnerable child
refugee applicants, this elevation of form is no longer enough.
VI. THE NEED To FORMALIZE A SINGULAR OBJECTIVE RISK APPROACH FOR
CHILDREN
The shift to a singular objective test must be formalized in order to
effectively protect the needs of child refugee applicants in the future.
Formalization will reduce the number of cases in which decision makers
abuse their discretion and will help to ensure that a child's independent legal
rights under the Convention are respected.
Through guidelines and judicial discretion, the reality for most child
applicants is that the objective risk plus subjective apprehension approach
has been transformed into a singular objective risk test. 7 8 However, this
procedural approach of informally exempting child refugee applicants from
the subjective apprehension element is not enough, because the harm of
denying protection to a child who faces objective risk but cannot enunciate
his or her subjective apprehension regarding that risk is too great. There
must be a formal and substantive recognition that, at minimum, child
refugee applications should only be analyzed under an objective risk test. 7 9
Since the unique vulnerability of child refugee applicants has been
recognized over and over,'8 ° and due to the difficulties and potential
impossibility child refugee applicants face in conceiving or articulating their
177. See discussion supra Part V.A.
178. See discussion supra Part V.
179. James Hathaway has argued that the subjective apprehension element should not be a part of
the well-founded fear analysis at all, and therefore, no refugee claim should be analyzed in a
bipartite fashion. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 507, 509. However, that
argument is beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent discussion and analysis regarding
whether the subjective apprehension element should be required for any refugee applicant, see id.
180. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
subjective apprehension,"' it is a denial of effective protection if child
refugee applicants are forced to be solely at the mercy of a procedural
exemption or the "sensitivity"1 82 of decision makers.
A. The Failure of the Procedural Exemption Approach
The failure of the procedural exemption from the subjective
apprehension element of the well-founded fear analysis can be seen most
clearly in a recent case in the United States.183  In Abay v. Ashcrofi,
Yayeshwork Abay and her minor daughter, Burhan Amare, citizens of
Ethiopia, appealed an immigration judge's denial of their claims for
asylum. 184 Amare's claim for asylum was based on her fear that if she were
returned to Ethiopia she would become the victim of forced genital
mutilation. 85 At the time of her appearance before an immigration judge for
her asylum claim, Amare was nine-years old and she suffered from a
profound hearing impairment.1 86  At the immigration hearing, Amare
testified through a sign language interpreter that: "[s]he knew about
circumcision, did not want to be subjected to it because she feared it would
cause pain and bleeding, and was afraid to go back to Ethiopia because she
feared her relatives or future husband or husband's relatives would force her
to be circumcised."' 87 Despite the content of this testimony, and the fact that
the applicant was a nine-year-old hearing impaired child, "[t]he immigration
judge denied Amare's claim for asylum because she has 'no imminent fear
[of female genital mutilation], but rather a general ambiguous fear' if she is
deported."' 88 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the ruling
of the immigration judge in this case without opinion.189
The irrationality of denying refugee protection to a nine-year-old child
who testified about her subjective apprehension in the best manner she could
(especially when, as was the case in Abay, ample objective risk evidence
181. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
182. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 512. Hathaway discusses the concern of
a denial of refugee status for applicants like children who may be unable to experience or articulate
their fear: "[m]ost courts have been sensitive to such cases, and have exempted children and
mentally disabled persons from the duty to demonstrate trepidation as a precondition for refugee
status." Id.
183. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).
184. Id. at 635-36.
185. Id. at 636.
186. Id. at 639.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 639-40.
189. Id. at 635-36.
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was on the record) 9' was not lost on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 9'
In reversing the immigration judge's decision on Amare's asylum claim, the
Sixth Circuit pointed out that the immigration judge's analysis on the
subjective apprehension element of well-founded fear "[does] not take the
full picture into account. ' 92 In other words, the immigration judge's
analysis did not give the child refugee applicant the procedural exemption to
which she was entitled. The Sixth Circuit explained that:
[a]t the time of the hearing, Amare was a nine-year-old child
testifying in court about an extremely personal matter. Although her
expression of fear in that context may have come across as
"general" or "ambiguous," we note that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's guidelines for children's asylum claims,
following the recommendations of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status (1992), advises adjudicators to
assess an asylum claim keeping in mind that very young children
may be incapable of expressing fear to the same degree or with the
same level of detail as an adult. In recommending a course of
action for evaluating a child's fear, the Children's Guidelines note
that the adjudicator must take the child's statements into account,
but that "children under the age of 16 may lack the maturity to form
a well-founded fear ofpersecution, thus requiring the adjudicator to
give more weight to objective factors." Further, the Guidelines
suggest that "children's testimony should be given liberal 'benefit
of the doubt' with respect to evaluating a child's alleged fear of
persecution."''
93
The Sixth Circuit then employed the analysis outlined in both the INS
Guidelines and the UNHCR Handbook and discussed the objective risk
factors in Amare's case. 94 The Sixth Circuit took note of the "nearly
universal" practice of female genital mutilation in Ethiopia, and surmised
190. See id. at 640 (If deported, Amare would have been returned to Ethiopia, a country where the
practice of female genital mutilation "is 'nearly universal' with 90% of females having been
subjected to some form of it.").
191. Id. It should be noted that where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals points out the failure of
the immigration judge to take the "full picture into account," the BIA, in affirming the case, also
failed Amare in the same manner. Id.
192. Id. at 640.
193. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
194. Id.
that even if Amare's mother protected her from female genital mutilation in
the short term, in the future Amare would be "forced to choose between
marriage and likely mutilation on the one hand, and social ostracism on the
other."' 195 These objective risk factors, at least for the Sixth Circuit, resulted
in a finding that Amare did have a legitimate well-founded fear of
persecution. 1
96
Admittedly, at the end of the day the Sixth Circuit applied the
procedural exemption in Amare's case.' 97 However, this case actually
exemplifies the failure of the procedural exemption approach. This is
because under the procedural exemption approach, decision makers must at
least engage in a cursory analysis of subjective apprehension, making it too
easy for them to use the subjective apprehension element to deny protection
to child refugee applicants who face documented objective risk simply
because the children articulate their own fears in a non-adult fashion, or, in
the words of the immigration judge in Abay, in a "general" or "ambiguous"
fashion. 198 If a nine-year-old hearing impaired child who faces a "nearly
universal" risk of persecution is denied protection because of a lack of
subjective apprehension, one wonders just who is supposed to benefit from
the procedural exemption.
While the child in Abay ultimately won asylum through her appeal to
the federal courts,' 99 it is unrealistic to think that appeals to the federal courts
will always be a safety net to fix the errors of the Board of Immigration
Appeals and immigration judges on the subjective apprehension element of
well-founded fear for child refugee applicants. 00 In the United States in
2004, fifty-five percent of all individuals in removal proceedings did not
have legal representation. 0' Without the aid of legal counsel, appeals to the
federal courts can be impossible for pro se applicants due to the expense and
process involved with filing the federal appeal. The child in Abay was one
of the lucky refugee applicants: her mother had obtained legal counsel for
their case and she was not in detention waiting for the outcome of her
case.202 The fact that the applicants in Abay were not detained and had legal
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 642-43.
200. See generally Claire Cooper, Immigration Appeals Swamp Federal Courts, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 5, 2004, at Al ("Because of changes in the way the U.S. Department of Justice handles
immigration cases, federal circuit courts are being buried under a 600 percent increase in deportation
and asylum appeals, leading some judges to worry whether they can deliver justice.").
201. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2004
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, FIGURE 9, G-1 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy04syb.pdf.
202. SeeAbay, 368 F.3d at 636.
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representation, and therefore could more easily pursue their federal appeal
cannot be underestimated. Detained asylum seekers, especially children, are
more likely to simply abandon their claims rather than sit in detention for
years on end. °3
Relying on the federal courts to ensure protection for child refugee
applicants who are not given the procedural exemption is even more difficult
after the passage of the REAL ID Act (REAL ID).204 The Abay case was
decided before REAL ID was enacted. 20 5 REAL ID contains provisions that
will negatively impact all asylum seekers, but especially children.20 6 Under
REAL ID, decision makers can now in their discretion base an adverse
credibility determination on "demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the
applicant" 207 and on inaccuracies or falsehoods of statements that do no not
go to the heart of the applicant's claim, even if such statements were not
made under oath.20 8  In light of the difficulties already identified regarding
the cultural, language, and educational barriers between asylum seekers and
decision makers,20 9 the fact that REAL ID allows decision makers to make
adverse credibility decisions based on demeanor could be disastrous.
Federal appeals courts may struggle to overcome such adverse findings,
since they will never see the child refugee applicant and must therefore rely
heavily on the immigration judge's findings regarding demeanor.
203. Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Detention, supra note 103, at 59 ("Detention may
have the effect of inducing children to abandon their claims, especially when detention is prolonged
and conditions are poor"). See Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: A Proposal
for Ending the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 197, 224 (1999)
(noting that prolonged detention induces "genuine asylum seekers to abandon their claims in the
hope of facilitating an earlier release from detention, in spite of the fact that they may suffer further
persecution if returned to their home country"); see also Women's Commission, Prison Guard or
Parent?, supra note 104, at 2 (noting that because of a lack of legal representation, "many children
asylum seekers give up hope and agree to deportation; in some cases, these children had earlier
expressed a fear of return to their homelands.").
204. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Division B, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) [hereinafter
REAL ID].
205. Abay was decided on May 19, 2004. Abay, 368 F.3d at 364. REAL ID was signed into law
on May 11,2005. REAL ID.
206. See generally Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Serv., Pending Legislation Would Hurt the
Most Vulnerable Immigrants and Violate American Values, 2005,
http://tnumc.org/index.cfm?PAGEID=1134&EXPAND=119 (discussing that child refugee
applicants will have a hard time understanding and meeting the new burdens of proof required under
REAL ID).
207. REAL 1D § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii).
208. Id.
209. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
B. Hidden Dangers Within the Current Procedural Exemption Approach
Not only should cases like Abay serve as a warning bell to the
vulnerability child refugee applicants face in refugee determination
processes, but a closer look at the procedural exemption approaches used by
the UNHCR, the United States, and Canada also triggers an alarm. In many
situations, the approaches taken by the UNHCR, the United States, and
Canada2 '0 are helpful, but do not go far enough. In fact, if applied in certain
situations, they could even be a barrier to effective protection for child
refugee applicants. For example, in the United States, the INS Guidelines
are only binding on asylum officers.21' The INS Guidelines are not binding
on immigration judges, the BIA, or the federal courts.21 2 The ability for
these decision makers to simply and legally ignore the INS Guidelines can
lead to a loss of effective protection for child refugee applicants.
Even when the procedural exemption is applied, protection is not
guaranteed. In some cases, the procedural approaches taken to exempt child
refugee applicants from the subjective apprehension element look like an
effective solution on their face, but can have tragic consequences. The INS
Guidelines, Canadian Guidelines, UNHCR Handbook, and various decision
makers213 impute the will or the subjective apprehension of the parents rather
than require that the child articulate his or her own subjective
apprehension.1 4 Under this imputed apprehension approach, a child refugee
applicant, as discussed in Chen Shi Hai above, may not get an individualized
determination of his or her claim. 215
A second problem with the imputation approach arises when the parents
do not have the subjective apprehension necessary for the child refugee
applicant's claim. To illustrate how this situation could occur, the facts of
the Abay case only need to be modified slightly. In that case, the written
application for asylum did not mention female genital mutilation.21 6 The
focus of the written application was on a political opinion claim by the
mother.217 In the Abay case, the mother actually testified about her fear that
210. See discussion supra Part V.A.
211. Caroline J. O'Neill, Health Is a Human Right: Why the U.S. Immigration Law Response to
Gender-Based Asylum Claims Requires More Attention to International Human Rights Norms, 17 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 241,244 (2000).
212. Id. at244n.19.
213. See, e.g., Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170
A.L.R. 553 (Austl.).
214. See id.; INS Guidelines, supra note 14, at § (11l)(C); Child Refugee Guidelines, supra note
13, § (13)(l); UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 218.
215. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
216. Final Brief of Respondent at 21 n.8, Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
3795).
217. Seeid.at20-21.
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her daughter would be subjected to female genital mutilation.1 However,
imagine the quite plausible scenario that Amare's mother was either not
opposed to female genital mutilation or did not testify regarding her feelings
on female genital mutilation. Under those facts, there would have been no
evidence on the record regarding a subjective apprehension of female genital
mutilation. Even if Amare's mother was opposed to female genital
mutilation, it is reasonable to think that she might not volunteer her feelings
about female genital mutilation, considering that it had happened to her
many years ago and that her asylum claim was based on political opinion. In
such a case, imputing the "fear" of the parent would have been quite
detrimental to the child refugee applicant, and could have resulted in the
child being denied protection.
Even if we assume that the approach of imputing a parent or other
adult's fears to a child refugee applicant would not result in the unwarranted
denial of refugee protection, this solution does not solve the problem of
requiring a subjective apprehension for all child refugee applicants.
Separated children do not arrive with a parent or caregiver, so, under the
current well-founded fear analysis, decision makers must still require the
child to demonstrate his or her own subjective apprehension.
One of the greatest dangers in continuing to accept the "form over
substance" dance of the procedural exemption approach is that none of the
guidance issued by either governments or the UNHCR truly addresses the
core issue of whether and when a child refugee applicant has the capacity to
have a subjective apprehension. As the language of the Chen Shi Hai case
reminds US, 219 because governments and the UNHCR are not focusing on
capacity, the possibility exists for disturbing abuses to occur in the future.
In Chen Shi Hai the court notes that "[n]o point has been taken that, by
reason of his age and circumstances, the appellant, himself, lacks the fear
necessary to bring him within the Convention definition of 'refugee.'
2 ' 20
This remark implies that although this court did not deny refugee protection
to the child refugee applicant because of a failure to articulate subjective
apprehension, other courts could easily have done so. In fact, none of the
guidelines or guidance issued by the UNHCR draws a bright line exemption
rule, even for infants. While acknowledging that children under the age of
sixteen may lack the maturity to form a well-founded fear of persecution, 
2 2
218. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2004).
219. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
220. Chen Shi Hai, 170 A.L.R. at 4.
221. See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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neither the United States, Canada, nor the UNHCR encourage or require
decision makers to formally exempt any child refugee applicant from
articulating subjective apprehension. 2
The issue of whether a child has capacity to know of the objective risk
in order to form a subjective apprehension exists in the cases of both
separated and accompanied child refugee applicants. For example, imagine
that in 1994, a two-year-old female Tutsi child arrives alone in the United
States from Rwanda. This child does not have the capacity to know she
faced an objective risk of genocide despite the ample existence of such
evidence.2 13 It is difficult to reconcile how returning her to Rwanda because
of her inability to conceive of a subjective apprehension would satisfy the
refugee definition or would comply with the protection goals of the
Convention.224 However, this outcome is entirely possible under the current
procedural exemption approach.
Unfortunately, for a child who arrives with a caregiver or parent,
capacity can still be an issue. To demonstrate, we once again need only to
modify slightly the facts of Abay. In the real case, the child refugee
applicant was aware of her risk of female genital mutilation.2 5 However,
imagine the realistic scenario that because her parents had protected her
from female genital mutilation, she had no knowledge of it. Without the
knowledge of female genital mutilation, Amare could not testify regarding
any type of subjective apprehension of female genital mutilation. The fact
that Amare was protected from the horrors of female genital mutilation and,
therefore, would not have the capacity to form a subjective apprehension
does not change the objective risk that she faces. However, since the current
guidance from Canada, the United States, and the UNHCR, subjective
apprehension still requires children to demonstrate subjective
apprehension.2 6 Under these facts, Amare could easily lose her refugee
claim because she does not have the capacity to know of the risk of
persecution that she faces and therefore can not articulate an apprehension of
that risk.
Cases like Abay show that the UNHCR and signatories to the
Convention and Protocol cannot keep doing the "form over substance"
dance regarding the subjective apprehension element for child refugee
applicants. By continuing to promote the fallacy that well-founded fear
contains a subjective apprehension element for child refugee applicants
222. See discussion supra Part V.A.
223. The history of genocide in Rwanda has been well documented. See generally Organization
for African Unity, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, GA Res. 47/1, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 12, UN Doc. A/47/49 (May 7,2000).
224. See discussion supra Part I.
225. Abay, 368 F.3d at 639-40.
226. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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(despite their handbooks, guidelines, procedures and the decisions of their
adjudicators implicitly and explicitly stating the opposite) the UNHCR, the
United States, and Canada are putting vulnerable children at risk. The stakes
are simply too high to continue down this road.
VII. BENEFITS OF A SINGULAR OBJECTIVE RISK APPROACH FOR CHILDREN
Eliminating the subjective apprehension element and relying on a
singular objective risk test for child refugee applicants has advantages for
both children and decision makers. A singular objective test for the well-
founded fear analysis would mean that the decision maker would focus
solely on whether a child has a forward-looking expectation of risk and if
that risk is well-founded.227
One advantage for children is that they will not be forced to attempt to
testify to their fears. Focusing on the objective risk evidence should
eliminate the amount of time children will either have to be interviewed or
testify, reducing the stress placed on children during their refugee status
determination.
Reducing the amount of evidence that must come from the child also
saves adjudicative resources. Interviewers will not need to spend as much
time trying to pull together a story that unequivocally demonstrates
subjective apprehension; consequently, less time means less money needed
to pay both court officials and interpreters. Relying on objective risk
227. See James Hathaway, Third Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law: The
Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear, 26 MICH J. INT'L L. 491, 497 (2005). Hathaway
explains that:
In contrast to the question of whether an applicant is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the country of origin's protection, the assessment of well-founded
fear does not comprise any evaluation of an applicant's state of mind.
Most critically, the protection of the Refugee Convention is not predicated on the
existence of 'fear' in the sense of trepidation. It requires instead the demonstration of
'fear' understood as a forward-looking expectation of risk. Once fear so conceived is
voiced by the act of seeking protection, it falls to the state party assessing refugee status
to determine whether that expectation is bome out by the actual circumstances of the
case. If it is, then the applicant's fear (that is, his or her expectation) of being persecuted
should be adjudged well-founded.
The determination of whether an applicant's 'fear'-in the sense of forward-looking
expectation of risk-is, or is not, 'well-founded' is thus purely evidentiary in nature. It
requires the state party assessing refugee status to determine whether there is a significant
risk that the applicant may be persecuted. While the mere chance or remote possibility of
being persecuted is insufficient to establish a well-founded fear, the applicant need not
show that there is a clear probability that he or she will be persecuted.
Id.
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evidence will save decision makers from the inconvenience of creating
innovative ways of circumventing the subjective apprehension element. It
should also reduce the number of appeals because there should no longer be
cases where applications are rejected due to lack of subjective apprehension
where objective risk evidence does exist, such as in Abay.228 Many of the
difficulties inherent in child refugee applications, such as inability to express
fear and reluctance to disclose fear to authorities, will be eliminated or at
least greatly reduced by using a singular objective test rather than the
objective risk plus subjective apprehension approach.
In addition, implementing a singular objective test ensures that children
will not be denied protection because of an inability to conceive of a fear or
to communicate their personal fear, especially in countries where guidelines
have not yet been adopted. Plus, although decision maker discretion has at
times in the past been favorable to child refugee applicants, the climate
towards refugees changes over time, and a child's claim should not hinge on
whether a decision maker is going to ignore or can create a way to
circumvent the subjective element of the objective risk plus subjective
apprehension approach.
Adopting a singular objective test does not eliminate the ability of
decision makers to take into account particularized vulnerabilities of the
refugee applicant.2 9 When analyzing well-founded fear under the singular
objective risk approach, "evidence of an applicant's susceptibility to
increased harm is appropriately considered as part of the analysis of whether
the substantive harm feared amounts to a risk of 'being persecuted.'
230
Focusing on the particularized vulnerability of the refugee applicant during
the analysis of "being persecuted" also allows for the incorporation of the
views of the child as required under the Convention of the Rights of the
Child. 3
By protecting children more effectively, the singular objective test
approach furthers the protection goals of the Convention and is more
consistent with the Convention than the objective risk plus subjective
apprehension approach for child refugee applicants.
228. See Abay, 368 F.3d at 634.
229. See Hathaway, Well-Founded Fear, supra note 8, at 551.
230. Id.
231. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 99, at art. 12(1) (explaining that
"States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.").
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article discusses the failure and irrationality of the current
approach taken by the UNHCR and most governments regarding the
subjective apprehension element of the well-founded fear analysis as it
applies to child refugee applicants. Currently, Canada, the United States, the
UNHCR and numerous decision makers informally, through a procedural
exemption, eliminate the requirement of subjective apprehension for child
refugee applicants.232 This elevation of form over substance is failing. It
can result in a denial of effective protection to child refugee applicants,
especially young children.
The UNHCR and all of the signatories to the Convention and the
Protocol should modify their current approaches to well-founded fear and
formally exempt all child refugee applicants from the subjective
apprehension element. Transforming the well-founded fear analysis into a
singular objective risk test for child refugee applicants should not be a huge
shift for the UNHCR, governments, or decision makers. As seen throughout
this Article, through different guidelines and decision maker discretion, this
modification has already been occurring incrementally in some jurisdictions.
Now is the time to put form and substance on the same level to help ensure
that child refugee applicants can truly access the promise of protection held
out by the Convention and the Protocol.
232. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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